Federal judges question tariff authority
- On May 7, a three-judge Court of International Trade panel blocked Trump’s new Section 122 tariffs, saying Congress did not hand over open-ended tariff power. - The panel stressed Section 122 caps tariffs at 15% and 150 days — a narrow tool, not a standing license for broad trade redesign. - That matters because the Supreme Court already killed Trump’s IEEPA tariff theory in February, leaving narrower statutes as the next legal battleground.
Tariff law is suddenly a separation-of-powers story. The basic fight is not whether presidents can ever raise tariffs — they can. The fight is whether Donald Trump can use narrow emergency or balance-of-payments statutes to build sweeping tariff programs that look more like Congress writing trade policy. A three-judge panel at the Court of International Trade sharpened that line on May 7, 2026, when it blocked a new set of Trump tariffs imposed under Section 122 of the Trade Act. ### What changed this week? The Court of International Trade granted summary judgment to Washington state, Burlap and Barrel, and Basic Fun, and entered a permanent injunction against the Section 122 tariffs they challenged. The same opinion threw out many other state plaintiffs for lack of standing, but the key point is the merits ruling: the court said the administration’s tariff program exceeded what Section 122 allows. (cit.uscourts.gov) ### What is Section 122, exactly? Section 122 is not a general presidential tariff wand. It is an older statute Congress wrote for a specific problem — serious balance-of-payments trouble. And Congress built limits into it. The trade court said those limits matter because they show lawmakers delegated a narrow, temporary power rather than a blank check to remake tariff policy by proclamation. (cit.uscourts.gov) ### Why are judges so focused on limits? Because the numbers are the whole point. The court’s opinion says Section 122 authorizes tariffs only up to 15% and only for 150 days. That is a stopgap tool. If a president could stretch that into a broad, durable tariff regime, the statutory caps would stop meaning anything — and Congress’s role in setting tariffs would shrink with them. ### Why does “separation of powers” keep coming up? (cit.uscourts.gov) The judges basically said tariff cases are not just about trade mechanics. They are also about who gets to make the rules. The opinion ties its reading of Section 122 to separation-of-powers concerns and to legislative intent, which is court-speak for a simple idea: when Congress delegates something as economically powerful as tariffs, courts expect the delegation to be clear and bounded. ### Haven’t courts already hit Trump on tariffs? Yes — and that is why this ruling matters more than a normal trade case. In February 2026, the Supreme Court held that IEEPA, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, does not authorize the president to impose tariffs. That case covered Trump’s drug-trafficking tariffs on Canada, Mexico, and China, plus his “reciprocal” tariff program. The Court described those tariffs as effectively unbounded in scope, amount, and duration. (cit.uscourts.gov) ### So what is the administration trying now? Basically, after losing the broad emergency-power theory under IEEPA, the administration has looked to narrower statutes that the Supreme Court did not bless or kill in the same way. Section 122 is one of those fallback routes. But the catch is that fallback statutes come with tighter text, tighter history, and tighter caps — which makes them easier for judges to police. (supremecourt.gov) ### Does this have anything to do with the WTO? Not directly in the domestic holding. The trade court is reading U.S. statutes, not enforcing WTO rules. But there is an indirect connection: if domestic courts say presidents cannot improvise giant tariff programs without clear congressional authorization, that also narrows the room for tariff moves that would trigger wider trade retaliation and WTO fights. That part is an inference from the legal structure, not the holding itself. (supremecourt.gov) ### What happens next? Appeals are the obvious next step. But the bigger shift is conceptual. Courts now seem far less willing to treat old trade and emergency statutes as elastic enough to support modern, economy-wide tariff experiments. That does not end presidential tariff power. It does mean judges are drawing brighter lines around it. ### Bottom line The new tariff fight is not really about whether tariffs are good policy. (cit.uscourts.gov) It is about whether the president can find a statute — any statute — and stretch it into Congress-sized authority. Federal judges are signaling that the answer is increasingly no.