India praised for restraint

India’s foreign policy is being praised by supporters as deliberately restrained: keep ties with Russia, Ukraine, Israel, Iran and the Gulf open, and avoid public escalation. (mea.gov.in) New Delhi repeated that formula on March 3, 2026, when the Ministry of External Affairs said India had urged “all sides to exercise restraint” after conflict spread in Iran and the Gulf region. The same statement said nearly one crore Indian citizens live and work in the Gulf and that India’s trade and energy supply chains run through the region. (mea.gov.in) On Gaza, India’s government told Parliament on July 24, 2025 that it had abstained at the United Nations General Assembly on June 12, 2025. The ministry said India still supported a two-state solution, had condemned the October 7, 2023 attacks on Israel, and had called for a ceasefire, hostage releases and humanitarian aid. (mea.gov.in) On Ukraine, India abstained again at the United Nations General Assembly on February 24, 2025, when two resolutions were put to a vote on the war’s third anniversary. Indian officials and joint statements have kept returning to the same language: dialogue, diplomacy, sovereignty and territorial integrity. (timesofindia.indiatimes.com, mea.gov.in) That posture sits on top of hard interests. India’s March 3 statement linked West Asia directly to citizen safety, merchant shipping, trade flows and energy security, and said Prime Minister Narendra Modi and External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar had been in touch with counterparts. (mea.gov.in) Russia is the other pillar. In a joint statement after Vladimir Putin’s December 4-5, 2025 visit to India, the two governments reaffirmed their “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership” and called the relationship a shared foreign-policy priority in its 25th anniversary year. (mea.gov.in) Indian analysts describe the method as “multi-alignment” or “strategic autonomy”: work with several rival camps at once instead of joining one bloc. The Royal United Services Institute said in July 2025 that India was balancing the West and Russia under sanctions pressure, while Observer Research Foundation wrote in March 2026 that New Delhi was trying to stay engaged with Iran, Gulf monarchies, Israel and the United States at the same time. (rusi.org, orfonline.org) Critics say abstentions can look evasive when wars produce large civilian tolls. Supporters answer that India’s access to multiple capitals depends on not turning every crisis into a public alignment test. (thewire.in, theweek.in) The pattern is now clear enough that even routine Indian statements read like doctrine: urge restraint, keep channels open, protect nationals, and leave room to talk to everyone. In a period of Russia-West confrontation and repeated Middle East shocks, that is the line New Delhi keeps choosing. (mea.gov.in, mea.gov.in, mea.gov.in)