Moscow shows signs of overstretch

Russia still wants to look like a global power. But the map is starting to say otherwise. The new trigger here is a May 12 GIS report by Stefan Hedlund arguing that the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine has pushed Moscow into a quieter kind of retreat — not a dramatic collapse, but a series of pullbacks from places it used to influence almost by default. ### What changed this week? The immediate news is Hedlund’s argument that Russia is no longer able, or willing, to fully defend key partners and outposts outside the Ukraine war. He frames Iran as the clearest test case: despite a high-profile strategic partnership signed in January 2025, Moscow chose not to decisively back Tehran when pressure on the Iranian regime spiked. ### Why is Iran the giveaway? (gisreportsonline.com) Because Iran mattered to Russia in practical ways, not just symbolic ones. Tehran supplied Shahed drones for Russia’s war effort, and the two sides were building energy ties and the North-South transport corridor linking Russia toward the Indian Ocean. If there were ever a partner Moscow should have protected to prove it still had reach, this was the one. But even analysts sympathetic to Russian strategy say direct military intervention to save the Iranian regime was never realistic. ### Is this just about Iran? No — Syria is the other big clue. Hedlund points to the fall of Bashar al-Assad and the loss of Tartus as a major blow to Russia’s Mediterranean posture. Other analysts note that Moscow is still trying to preserve leverage in Syria through Hmeimim, Tartus-related access, and political deals, so this is not total eviction. But the point is narrower: Russia is spending more effort defending remnants of old influence than expanding new influence. (gisreportsonline.com) ### Why does Ukraine drive all of this? Because wars eat options. Russia’s full-scale invasion turned what used to be a flexible regional power into a state forced to prioritize one giant front above everything else. Hedlund’s core claim is that military exhaustion in Ukraine and sudden pressure on Tehran created a double bind for Putin. He could posture globally, or conserve resources for the war that actually threatens his regime’s standing. He chose the second. (gisreportsonline.com) ### Who is moving into the gaps? Mostly Turkiye and China. Hedlund says Turkiye is expanding influence across the South Caucasus and Central Asia, while China is deepening control over energy, trade, and infrastructure tied to Russia’s eastern flank. Separate work on Central Asia makes the same basic point in less dramatic language — Beijing is increasingly the region’s economic center of gravity, and Russia’s old security-first model is losing traction. (gisreportsonline.com) ### Is Central Asia really shifting too? Yes, though more by erosion than rupture. Armenia’s drift from Moscow after Russia and the CSTO failed to protect it is one signal from the wider neighborhood. In Central Asia itself, analysts increasingly describe a system where Russia no longer automatically sets the rules, while China and, to a lesser extent, Turkiye gain room to maneuver. (gisreportsonline.com) ### Does this mean Russia is finished as a power? No. The catch is that retreat is not disappearance. Russia still has nuclear weapons, energy exports, intelligence networks, arms ties, and the ability to spoil outcomes well beyond its borders. In Syria, for example, its position is weaker but not gone. In Iran, Moscow may still profit from higher energy prices and from a more dependent Tehran if the regime survives. (carnegieendowment.org) ### So what’s the real bottom line? The story is not that Russia suddenly collapsed. It’s that Ukraine has made every other commitment more expensive, and rivals can see it. Once that happens, influence starts to leak away one theater at a time. (gisreportsonline.com) (carnegieendowment.org)