AI‑chip export drive stalls

Washington spent 2025 and early 2026 rewriting the rules for who can buy the world’s most advanced artificial-intelligence chips, then pulled one draft after another before companies could plan around them. On March 13, 2026, the Commerce Department withdrew a draft rule that would have required U.S. approval for many overseas chip deals, leaving exporters waiting again for a replacement. (usnews.com) These chips are the engines inside giant data centers that train systems like chatbots and image generators. The fight is over whether American firms like Nvidia and Advanced Micro Devices can sell those engines abroad without helping China or other rivals build military or surveillance tools. (federalregister.gov) (bis.gov) The Biden administration started tightening this area on October 7, 2022, when the Bureau of Industry and Security blocked China’s access to high-end computing chips and chipmaking tools. It tightened the screws again on October 17, 2023, after companies found workarounds and redesigned products to stay just inside the rules. (bis.doc.gov 1) (bis.doc.gov 2) Then, on January 13, 2025, Biden officials published the “Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion,” a global rule that split countries into groups and set new license rules for advanced chips and even some artificial-intelligence model weights. The rule was supposed to take effect in stages, with a main compliance date of May 15, 2025. (federalregister.gov) (bis.gov) That January 2025 framework tried to answer a basic question every cloud company asks before it builds a server farm: if I buy 50,000 or 200,000 chips, will Washington let them ship? Biden’s answer was a tiered map, with close allies getting broad access, many other countries facing caps, and countries of concern largely blocked. (federalregister.gov) (usnews.com) But that system never really settled in. On May 13, 2025, the Commerce Department under new leadership initiated a rescission of the Biden diffusion rule and told enforcement officials not to enforce it, while issuing fresh guidance instead of a finished replacement rule. (akingump.com) That left companies in the worst spot for capital spending: the old map was being dismantled, and the new map did not exist yet. Reuters reported that the March 2026 draft would have tied very large exports to foreign investment in U.S. data centers or government-to-government security guarantees, but that proposal was also pulled. (usnews.com) The numbers in that abandoned draft show why boardrooms were rattled. Reuters said foreign firms seeking 200,000 chips or more could have been asked for investment commitments in the United States, while buyers seeking up to 100,000 chips would have needed government assurances. (usnews.com) This is not just a China story anymore. The January 2025 rule was global by design, so uncertainty hit countries that are not U.S. adversaries but still need to know whether a new data center in Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, or the United Arab Emirates will qualify for chips, licenses, or exceptions. (federalregister.gov) (usnews.com) The result is a policy that looks tougher in speeches than on paper. Gina Raimondo said in January 2025 that the rule would give “greater clarity” to partners and industry, but by March 2026 the replacement rule had been withdrawn and the licensing framework was still unresolved. (bis.gov) (usnews.com) That is why the stall matters beyond the handful of companies making the very top chips. When the government cannot say with confidence which customer, country, and chip count will clear review, every export contract, data-center lease, and factory forecast starts carrying a political risk premium. (federalregister.gov) (akingump.com)