Telegram founder slams WhatsApp backups
Telegram’s founder publicly criticised WhatsApp’s end‑to‑end encryption claims, arguing that cloud backups weaken practical privacy because messages stored outside the encrypted channel can be accessed. Multiple tech outlets amplified the claim, noting that metadata, device backups and cloud storage create privacy gaps even where in‑transit encryption exists. (digit.in, moneycontrol.com)
Pavel Durov, Telegram’s founder, said on April 11 that WhatsApp’s privacy claims are undermined when chat backups sit in Apple or Google cloud storage. (caliber.az) His post on X called WhatsApp’s encryption pitch a “giant consumer fraud” and claimed “95%” of private messages end up in unencrypted backups, a figure repeated by several tech outlets over the weekend. (caliber.az, msn.com) The technical issue is narrower than the slogan. End-to-end encryption protects messages while they travel between devices, but a backup is a separate copy saved to Google Drive or iCloud for phone recovery. (about.fb.com) WhatsApp has offered an optional end-to-end encrypted backup setting since October 14, 2021, and said at launch that neither WhatsApp nor the backup provider could read those backups if users turned it on. (about.fb.com) Meta kept pushing that feature in October 2025, when it added passkey-protected backup encryption using a fingerprint, face scan, or screen lock instead of a memorized password or 64-digit key. (about.fb.com) WhatsApp answered Durov’s latest criticism on April 12 by saying its one-to-one chats, group chats, voice calls, video calls, and backups can all be end-to-end encrypted. (caliber.az) The fight also turns on what each app means by “secure.” Meta says WhatsApp has been end-to-end encrypted by default since 2016, while Telegram says its regular cloud chats use server-client encryption and its stronger end-to-end encryption is limited to Secret Chats. (about.fb.com, telegram.org) Telegram’s own FAQ says Secret Chats leave no trace on Telegram’s servers, support self-destruct timers, and are not part of Telegram’s cloud, which means they are not the default mode most Telegram users rely on every day. (telegram.org) So the current dispute is less about whether end-to-end encryption exists on WhatsApp than about where copies of chats end up after the conversation is over — on the device, in a cloud backup, or nowhere at all. (about.fb.com, telegram.org)
