Midterms face rising violence risks

Election security is back in the danger zone — but the weak point is not just hacked machines or phishing emails. It’s the people running elections, and the shrinking support system around them. The clearest news this week came from Sen. Mark Warner, who said state and local officials are reporting a drop in training, intelligence sharing, and cybersecurity help from CISA ahead of the 2026 midterms. At the same time, a fresh Brennan Center survey shows election administrators still expect harassment, interference, and politically motivated pressure to intensify as the campaign year heats up. ### What changed this week? Warner’s warning matters because it points to a concrete shift, not a vague mood. He said election offices are getting less federal support from CISA, the agency that has spent years helping states harden voter databases, websites, email systems, and other election infrastructure. That means fewer shared resources at the exact moment local officials are trying to prepare for a national election cycle that already looks tense. (defenseone.com) ### Why does CISA matter so much? Because most election offices are small. They do not have giant in-house security teams. CISA has been the federal backstop — offering risk assessments, cyber tools, and guidance for the systems most likely to be hit, including voter registration databases, email systems, and public-facing websites. If that support gets thinner, the burden shifts back to county and municipal offices that were already stretched. (defenseone.com) ### Is this only about cyberattacks? No — and that’s the part people miss. The Election Assistance Commission’s current guidance is full of practical physical-security advice: cameras, tamper-evident seals, chain-of-custody rules, coordination with law enforcement, even help for officials dealing with swatting and exposure of personal information online. That tells you the threat model has widened. The job is now part IT defense, part workplace security, part personal safety plan. (cisa.gov) ### What are local officials actually worried about? The Brennan Center’s latest survey gives the clearest snapshot. Half of local election officials said they are somewhat or very worried about political leaders interfering in election administration. Forty-five percent said they worry about being targeted by politically motivated investigations. That is a different kind of pressure than a normal busy election year — it means the referee is worried about becoming the target. (eac.gov) ### Why does that raise violence risks? Because election threats rarely start as organized mass violence. They start as intimidation, stalking, doxxing, armed protests, bomb threats, or swatting — actions that can shut offices, scare workers, and make routine decisions feel dangerous. Once that becomes normal, every disputed ballot batch or delayed count gets framed as proof of sabotage. Basically, the system becomes easier to jam even if nobody touches a voting machine. (brennancenter.org) ### Are federal agencies still engaged at all? Yes — but the posture looks uneven. The FBI invited election officials nationwide to a February 25 briefing with DHS, DOJ, the Postal Inspection Service, and the EAC about 2026 preparations and available resources. That shows the federal government still knows the risk is real. But a one-off briefing is not the same thing as a thick, trusted, ongoing support network. (eac.gov) ### Why does this matter now, months before voting? Because election security is mostly prep work. Offices need time to train staff, test systems, build law-enforcement relationships, and plan for disruptions before ballots go out and polling places open. If support is weaker in May, the gap compounds by November. ### Bottom line? The real story is not that violence is suddenly guaranteed. It’s that the guardrails look thinner while pressure on election workers is still high. (abcnews.com) That combination — persistent intimidation plus reduced backup — is what makes the 2026 midterms feel riskier than they should. (defenseone.com)