Türkiye's Black Sea leverage rises
Analysts say Türkiye has shifted toward a realist posture that increases its leverage in the Black Sea and within NATO. Commentators note Ankara’s control of chokepoints and recent actions—such as closing the Turkish Straits to restrict Russian reinforcement—have strengthened its bargaining position even as some allies raise concerns about alignment. (paturkey.com) (washingtonexaminer.com)
Türkiye’s hold over the Bosporus and Dardanelles has turned Ankara into a harder-to-bypass power in the Black Sea since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. (news.usni.org) On February 28, 2022, Turkey said it would apply the 1936 Montreux Convention and close the straits to warships of the warring parties, limiting naval access between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. The convention gives Ankara special authority over military transit through those waterways. (news.usni.org; lieber.westpoint.edu) That decision mattered most for Russia, which had used the straits as one route to move naval forces toward the Black Sea. Analysts at Brookings wrote in June 2024 that no United States or North Atlantic Treaty Organization Black Sea strategy can work without Turkey’s buy-in. (lieber.westpoint.edu; brookings.edu) Ankara then used its position inside the alliance as leverage on a second front: enlargement. Turkey’s parliament approved Sweden’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization bid in January 2024, and Sweden formally entered the alliance on March 7, 2024, after a delay that highlighted Turkey’s veto power. (commonslibrary.parliament.uk; state.gov) Black Sea security also became more operational in 2024. Türkiye, Romania, and Bulgaria activated the Mine Countermeasures Black Sea Task Group in Istanbul on July 1, 2024, to deal with drifting mines threatening shipping lanes. (navalnews.com; defensenews.com) That format suited Turkey’s preferences because it kept Black Sea naval cooperation in the hands of littoral states rather than a larger standing North Atlantic Treaty Organization fleet. Brookings described the mine-sweeping effort as a point of convergence between Turkish and United States policy after years of friction. (brookings.edu) Turkey’s position is not a clean alignment with the West. The Polish research center Centre for Eastern Studies wrote in June 2025 that Ankara still treats Russia as a challenge rather than a direct threat and continues economic cooperation with Moscow while resisting a bigger North Atlantic Treaty Organization footprint in the Black Sea. (osw.waw.pl) That leaves allies dealing with two facts at once: Turkey can obstruct alliance plans, and it can make them workable. In the Black Sea, the same geography that lets Ankara limit outside naval access also gives it a central role in any effort to contain Russian pressure. (brookings.edu; chathamhouse.org) The result is a narrower but stronger form of influence. Türkiye does not need to agree with every ally on every file to remain indispensable at the Black Sea’s only maritime gate. (brookings.edu; news.usni.org)
