Foreign Affairs flags India–Pakistan risks

South Asia’s risk problem is getting sharper, not calmer. India and Pakistan already fought their most intense clash in decades in May 2025, and neither side seems to have come away scared straight. Instead, both militaries appear to be drawing the opposite lesson — that they can push harder with drones, missiles, and long-range strikes without automatically crossing the nuclear line. That is the backdrop for the warning now coming into focus. (foreignaffairs.com) ### What changed after the 2025 clash? The four-day fight from May 7 to May 10, 2025 broke old patterns. India struck deeper into Pakistan than in past crises, and Pakistan answered with its own aerial and missile responses. The fighting reached military bases and urban areas, not just the usual contested frontier. That matters because crisis stability in South Asia used to rest partly on limits both sides mostly respected. Those limits now look weaker. (foreignaffairs.com) ### Why do analysts think the next war could be worse? Because both sides seem to think the last round proved something useful. The argument is not that nuclear danger disappeared. It is that planners in New Delhi and Rawalpindi may now believe they have more room for conventional punishment before nuclear escalation kicks in. That belief can be deadly even if (foreignaffairs.com)a riskier baseline. (foreignaffairs.com) ### Where does Washington fit in? The United States has often acted as the outside brake in India-Pakistan crises. But that brake may be weaker now. One reason is politics — India rejects outside mediation in principle, while Pakistan usually wants more external involvement. Another is perception. If Pakistani officials conclude Washington is more sympathetic t(foreignaffairs.com)battlefield. That does not require an actual formal “tilt.” The perception alone can change decisions. (foreignaffairs.com) ### What does Balochistan have to do with this? Quite a lot, turns out. Pakistan is also dealing with a violent insurgency in Balochistan, where the Baloch Liberation Army has attacked security forces and infrastructure around the Reko Diq mining zone. That is not just a local security story. Reko Diq is one of the country’s biggest hoped-for investment project(foreignaffairs.com)eral financing. Internal instability eats into state bandwidth exactly when external deterrence is getting shakier. (nytimes.com) ### Why is Reko Diq such a big signal? Because money is voting on risk. Barrick said on April 2 that it was slowing development activity and extending its project review until mid-2027 because of worsening security issues in Pakistan and the region. It also warned that the project’s capital budget and timeline could rise from earlier estimates, with first(nytimes.com)of pause, investors notice. (barrick.com) ### Does insurgency really affect India-Pakistan deterrence? Indirectly, yes — but indirectly can be enough. A state under internal pressure can become more brittle, more distracted, or more eager to show resolve elsewhere. At the same time, insurgent attacks on strategic economic projects deepen the sense that Pakistan’s security environme(barrick.com)nterstate rivalry can reinforce each other. (nytimes.com) ### So what is the real danger? The danger is not only a deliberate march to nuclear war. It is a ladder built from misread signals, new strike capabilities, and shrinking trust in outside crisis managers. Precision weapons can make leaders feel in control right up until they are not. South Asia now looks more like a system that can absorb one shock less, not one shock more. (foreignaffairs.com) ### Bottom line? The region’s old safety valves are wearing out. India and Pakistan learned from the 2025 fight, but not necessarily the right lesson. And Pakistan’s internal insurgency problem is colliding with that external rivalry at exactly the wrong time. (foreignaffairs.com)