Myanmar supply squeeze

Myanmar’s fuel, fertiliser and freight networks are tightening at the same time, squeezing farms, trade routes and a war economy already under severe strain. (fulcrum.sg) Myanmar imports about 95 percent of the fuel it uses, according to Institute for Strategy and Policy-Myanmar analysis published on March 12, and domestic output covers only a small fraction of demand. The same report said strategic reserves cover roughly 40 days, while the military authorities said two tankers had docked and 14 more were due. (ispmyanmar.com) The World Food Programme said on March 25 that the Iran crisis and the temporary closure of the Strait of Hormuz removed an estimated 20 percent of global oil supply and pushed prices up by more than 50 percent. In Myanmar, that shock produced long fuel queues from early March, rationing by odd and even licence plates from March 7, and black-market price increases after many stations capped sales. (reliefweb.int) The strain is spreading into agriculture just as planting begins. The South China Morning Post reported on April 8 that a 50 percent cut in fertiliser use this season could reduce farm output by 10 to 15 percent, citing the World Food Programme, while one-quarter of Myanmar’s population already lacks enough food. (scmp.com) Rare earths are adding a second supply-chain story. Institute for Strategy and Policy-Myanmar research published in June 2025 said Myanmar became China’s main external source of rare earth minerals from 2017 to 2024, with exports to China worth more than US$4 billion over that period and US$1.4 billion in 2023 alone. (ispmyanmar.com) Those minerals include dysprosium and terbium, two heavy rare earths used in high-temperature permanent magnets for defence systems, aerospace equipment and green technology. The same Institute for Strategy and Policy-Myanmar report said roughly two-thirds of China’s rare-earth imports by volume came from Myanmar over 2017 to 2024. (ispmyanmar.com) Asia Times reported on April 14 that this leaves the Quad — the United States, India, Japan and Australia — facing a bottleneck in northern Myanmar, where the ore is extracted but China still dominates the processing plants and magnet-making further down the chain. The article said China’s leverage rests less on mine ownership than on its near-monopoly in separation, metallization and magnet production. (asiatimes.com) Politics inside Myanmar grew more fragmented again on April 15, when Foundation for Defense of Democracies published an article reporting a new resistance alliance called the Strategic Command for the End of the Fascist Era, or SCEF. The article said the alliance brings together some of the country’s largest anti-junta groups and gives ethnic armed organizations operational military authority in joint planning. (fdd.org) That report described Myanmar’s civil war as 78 years old and said the National Unity Government retains political legitimacy but limited military capability, while ethnic armed organizations control significant territory and often work on separate tracks. A more coordinated resistance could alter who controls border roads, mining zones and fuel corridors as the supply squeeze deepens. (fdd.org) The immediate test is whether fuel arrivals, fertiliser access and transport capacity stabilize before the planting season slips further. If they do not, Myanmar’s shortages will keep hitting village markets and border mineral routes at the same time. (fulcrum.sg)