US House tightens AI export controls

House lawmakers moved this spring to tighten how advanced artificial intelligence chips and tools can be sold to China, pushing export rules closer to the center of U.S. tech policy. (foreignaffairs.house.gov) The House Foreign Affairs Committee advanced the Chip Security Act on March 26, 2026, and had already advanced the AI OVERWATCH Act on January 21, 2026. Chairman Brian Mast said the January bill would require licenses for certain chip exports and apply congressional oversight to sensitive sales. (foreignaffairs.house.gov; foreignaffairs.house.gov) The Chip Security Act was introduced as H.R. 3447 on May 15, 2025, and would require Commerce to issue standards for security mechanisms in integrated circuits. LegiScan says the committee ordered it reported 42-0 on March 26, 2026. (congress.gov; legiscan.com) The AI OVERWATCH Act, H.R. 6875, would amend the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 by creating a new section on exports of “covered integrated circuits” to “countries of concern.” Its introduced text says Commerce would have to require licenses for export, reexport, or in-country transfer of those chips. (congress.gov) The fight sits on top of a years-long U.S. effort to slow China’s access to advanced semiconductors, the processors that train and run modern artificial intelligence systems. A September 2025 Congressional Research Service report says Washington has been tightening these controls since 2018 to limit Chinese access to advanced chips, chipmaking capacity, and related computing power. (congress.gov) Congress is also responding to a December 2025 White House decision to let Nvidia sell its H200 chip to China under a new “security review” and 25% tariff arrangement. A March 23, 2026 Congressional Research Service legal analysis says that plan was implemented through Section 232 tariffs and a new export-license rule under the Export Control Reform Act. (congress.gov) That December decision sharpened the split in Washington. The same Congressional Research Service report says some stakeholders want looser rules to preserve U.S. market share in China, while others argue broader sales would help China close gaps in advanced computing. (congress.gov) Lawmakers from both parties have also focused on the equipment used to make chips, not just the chips themselves. On February 9, 2026, Mast and Ranking Member Gregory Meeks urged the State and Commerce departments to work with allies to close “critical gaps” in controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment sold to China. (foreignaffairs.house.gov) That equipment matters because the United States cannot easily verify where tools or chips end up once they are inside China. The same bipartisan letter said U.S. end-use checks require Chinese government permission, can take weeks or months, and are conducted under escort by Chinese security personnel. (foreignaffairs.house.gov) The committee’s agenda is wider than restriction alone. H.R. 6996, introduced January 9, 2026, would facilitate exports of U.S. artificial intelligence systems, computing hardware, and standards globally, while H.R. 8283 would try to stop foreign adversaries from extracting technical features from closed-source American AI models. (congress.gov; govinfo.gov) The next test is whether these committee bills are folded into broader changes to export-control law or stall before floor action. Either way, Congress is writing export restrictions into the business logic of chips, cloud computing, and AI sales to China. (legis1.com; congress.gov)