U.S. China policy drifts
- U.S. policy toward China is drifting because the administration's central tariff tool has been stalled, Reuters reports. (reuters.com) - The drift follows President Trump's return promising tariffs, but legal and political disruption has blunted tariffs' central role in strategy. (reuters.com) - The practical effect is greater ambiguity, leaving businesses and allies to face a more improvised, transactional U.S. approach. (reuters.com)
The Trump administration’s China policy has lost its main organizing tool: tariffs are tied up, and officials are improvising around them. (usnews.com) President Donald Trump returned to office on January 20, 2025, promising tariffs would reset relations with Beijing. More than a year later, Reuters reported that the trade moves have not fundamentally changed China’s trade behavior or military posture. (usnews.com) The White House did raise China-related duties in 2025 through a series of executive orders, including orders dated April 8, April 9, May 12 and July 31. Those actions were framed as “reciprocal tariffs” and later adjustments tied to talks with China. (whitehouse.gov) Congressional Research Service said those 2025 tariff actions relied in part on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, a law presidents use after declaring a national emergency. CRS also said the administration reached only a temporary tariff truce with China in 2025 while wider negotiations continued. (congress.gov) Older China tariffs never disappeared. The Office of the United States Trade Representative kept parts of the Section 301 tariff system in place and extended 178 product exclusions in November 2025 through November 10, 2026. (ustr.gov) That leaves Washington with overlapping tools instead of a single China strategy: legacy Section 301 tariffs from the first Trump era, newer emergency-based tariffs from 2025, export controls, investment screening and ad hoc bargaining. CRS said some 2025 negotiations stalled while others remained active. (congress.gov) Reuters described the result inside government as confusion and contradictory decisions. The practical effect outside government is that companies and U.S. allies face a less predictable policy line on trade, security and diplomacy with China. (asiaone.com) The administration has not stopped opening new trade cases. USTR launched a Section 301 probe into China’s semiconductor policies in December 2024 and posted a notice of action on December 29, 2025, showing pressure on Beijing is continuing through narrower channels even as the broader tariff push has bogged down. (ustr.gov) The immediate question is no longer whether Trump wants tariffs on China; he has already imposed and modified them. The question is which tool now sets policy, because the tariff-first approach that defined the opening of 2025 no longer appears to be doing that job. (usnews.com)
