Gulf diversifies ties with Russia, China
- Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Gulf states kept deepening parallel ties with China and Russia through 2025-26 in trade, finance, and oil policy. - The clearest markers are Saudi-Russian coordination inside OPEC+ and Gulf entry into BRICS, where Saudi Arabia and the UAE joined as members in 2024. - This matters because Gulf hedging now looks institutional, not symbolic — without replacing the US security umbrella.
The Gulf story here is not a clean break with Washington. It is a hedge. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and their neighbors are building extra lanes — with China for trade and technology, with Russia for oil coordination, and with BRICS for diplomatic leverage. That matters because the old model was simpler: security from the US, energy sold globally in a mostly Western-shaped system. The new model is messier, and much more multipolar. (opec.org) ### What actually changed? The big shift is that these ties are no longer occasional or tactical. They now sit inside formal structures. Saudi Arabia and the UAE became full BRICS members from January 2024, and both have kept using that platform through 2025 and into 2026. The UAE has been participating in BRICS finance meetings and even hosted a BRICS finance-track eve(opec.org)alking point into a recurring habit. (brics2026.gov.in) ### Why does Russia still matter? Russia matters because oil still matters. Saudi Arabia, Russia, the UAE, Kuwait, Oman, and others are still coordinating output through OPEC+. On January 4 and March 1, 2026, the core OPEC+ group — including Saudi Arabia and Russia — met virtually and reaffirmed production management decisions. So even while Moscow is weaker than before the U(brics2026.gov.in) to Gulf states through the one channel that directly moves prices and revenues. (opec.org) ### Why is China the bigger long-term play? Because China is where the Gulf sees scale. China is Saudi Arabia’s top trading partner, and Saudi officials spent 2025 building out new committees and investment channels with Beijing. A Saudi government statement from late August 2025 described a high-level visit to China as part of the Saudi-Chinese High-Level Joint C(opec.org)ghted that China is the kingdom’s foremost trading partner. This is not just about oil cargoes anymore — it is industry, technology, and investment. (spa.gov.sa) ### What about the UAE? The UAE is doing the same thing in its own style — more commercial, more networked, less ideological. The Emirati government says China accounted for 11.2% of the UAE’s non-oil trade in the first half of 2024, and that the UAE became China’s leading trading partner in the Middle East and Africa in 2023. Add BRICS participation and New Development Bank engagement(spa.gov.sa)ther than picking one camp. (moec.gov.ae)rper. (uecn.org) ### Are they leaving the US behind? No. That is the part people overstate. Even analysts who describe the Gulf as broadening its security partnerships still treat the US as the main military partner and arms supplier. The catch is that Gulf capitals no longer want exclusive dependence. They want American protection, Chinese markets, and working ties with Russia where interests overlap. Basically, they want redundancy. (semafor.com) ### So what is the real bottom line? The Gulf is not “switching sides.” It is institutionalizing a multi-alignment strategy. Russia gives it oil leverage. China gives it trade, capital, and industrial scale. BRICS gives it a political stage outside Western-led clubs. The US still anchors hard security, but it no longer gets strategic exclusivity by default. (opec.org)
