‘Long game’ over force
Some commentators in the thread argued China prefers a slow 'long game' of economic incentives rather than overt military force when dealing with Taiwan. (x.com) The framing emphasized carrots—trade and investment—as strategic tools rather than immediate coercion. (x.com)
Beijing is again pairing pressure on Taiwan with perks, unveiling 10 new incentives on April 12 after hosting Taiwan opposition leader Cheng Li-wun in China. (reuters.com) The new package includes looser tourism curbs, easier food sales into the mainland, permission for “healthy” Taiwan television dramas, and an exploration of regular talks between China’s Communist Party and Taiwan’s Kuomintang, or KMT. (cnbc.com) Taiwan pushed back on April 13, with a senior security official saying any response on trade and tourism should be handled by the government, not by party-to-party contacts. President Lai Ching-te’s administration has repeatedly said Beijing should talk to Taiwan’s elected leaders. (reuters.com) China’s case for economic leverage starts with scale. Taiwan’s government says cross-strait trade reached US$176.28 billion in 2024, and approved Taiwan investment in China since 1991 totaled US$210.02 billion by the end of 2024. (taiwan.gov.tw) That dependence is smaller than it used to be, but it is still large. Taiwan’s Ministry of Finance said exports to mainland China and Hong Kong fell from 43.9% of Taiwan’s total in 2020 to 31.7% in 2024, even as China and Hong Kong remained Taiwan’s biggest export market by value at US$150.6 billion. (service.mof.gov.tw) Beijing has mixed those incentives with penalties. In December 2023, China suspended tariff concessions on 12 Taiwanese chemical imports under the Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, known as ECFA, weeks before Taiwan’s January 13, 2024 presidential election. (cnbc.com) Taiwan’s government called that move economic coercion aimed at shaping a democratic vote. Its foreign ministry said the timing, less than a month before polling day, was meant to pressure voters. (mofa.gov.tw) The economic track has never replaced military pressure. Taiwan’s air force said that on August 27, 2025, it detected 23 Chinese military aircraft, seven navy ships and one official ship around Taiwan, with 16 aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait median line or entering Taiwan’s air defense identification zone. (air.mnd.gov.tw) United States officials have kept pointing to that military side of the equation. The top United States diplomat in Taiwan said on April 12 that China should stop threats and military pressure and talk directly with Taiwan’s leaders to reduce the risk of miscalculation. (reuters.com) Xi Jinping made Beijing’s political line explicit on April 10 when he told Cheng that China would “absolutely not tolerate” Taiwan independence, even as the two sides discussed peace and reconciliation. The result is a familiar pattern: offers on flights, tourism and market access alongside a standing threat of force. (reuters.com)