Gulf states pivot away from U.S.
- The clearest new move is the UAE’s January 19 defense pact-in-principle with India, while Saudi Arabia has already signed a mutual defense deal with Pakistan. - The war with Iran sharpened the logic: Gulf states intercepted about 85% of roughly 7,000 Iranian drones and missiles, but still saw cities hit. - This is less a clean break with Washington than a hedge — more partners, more local production, and fewer single-point dependencies.
The Gulf story is not “the region is leaving America.” That’s too neat, and basically wrong. The real change is narrower and more important — Gulf states still want U.S. protection, but they no longer want to depend on it alone. The Iran war made that painfully concrete. Missiles got through, supply chains strained, and the states sitting closest to the blast radius realized that buying more of the same is not the same thing as having options. ### What actually changed? Two moves matter most. On January 19, the UAE and India signed a letter of intent toward a Strategic Defense Partnership, with plans to expand cooperation in defense industry, advanced technology, training, special operations, cyber, and interoperability. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, had already signed a Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement with Pakistan on September 17, 2025. Those are not rumors or vibes — they are formal steps. ### Why now? Because the Iran war exposed the gap between expensive defenses and actual security. Gulf states activated air defenses across the bloc, with U.S. and allied help, and many incoming attacks were intercepted. But the region still experienced airport closures, no guaranteed answer to Hormuz disruption or a seat at the table shaping the aftermath. ### Is this really “away from the U.S.”? Not in a simple sense. Publicly, Gulf officials are still stressing the value of close U.S. ties. Privately, the emphasis has shifted toward diversification. Semafor’s reporting captures the mood well: the biggest beneficiaries of Gulf defense spending have been Western allies, especially the U.S., but Gulf capitals think hedge, not divorce. ### Why do India and Pakistan show up here? Because Gulf politics is no longer just Gulf politics. India brings scale, technology, trade, and a deep relationship with the UAE — India-UAE trade reached $85 billion in 2022-23, and the UAE is a major Gulf gateway for India. Pakistan brings military experience, long Saudi ties, and a formal defense pact with Saudi. ### Where does Israel fit? Mostly through the UAE side of the map. Analysts have described an emerging alignment that links the UAE, India, and Israel, while a looser counter-alignment gathers around Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan. That does not mean two fixed camps with matching war plans. It means the region is organizing itself through overlapping partnerships instead of one U.S.-anchored hierarchy. ### What about the Saudi-UAE split? It matters a lot. The old assumption was that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi generally moved together. That assumption has been breaking down for months, and the UAE’s decision to leave OPEC and OPEC+ on May 1, 2026 made the split much harder to ignore. Oil policy and security policy are not the same thing, but both point in the same direction — the Gulf is becoming more fragmented, competitive, and multipolar. ### So what’s the bottom line? The Gulf is not replacing Washington with Delhi, Islamabad, or anyone else. It is building a backup system. That matters because backup systems change behavior — they give smaller states more room to maneuver, make mediation harder, and turn local rivalries into wider networks. The U.S. is still in the picture. But it is no longer the only picture.
