Minerals Supply‑Chain Risk

The biggest mineral risk is no longer just digging rock out of the ground; it is who turns that rock into usable metal and chemicals. The International Energy Agency said China was the leading refiner for 19 of 20 strategic minerals in 2025, with an average market share of 70%. (iea.org) That concentration is heaviest in the middle of the chain, where ore is separated, refined, and converted into magnet metals, battery materials, and industrial chemicals. The International Energy Agency said China accounted for about 91% of rare-earth separation and refining and 94% of sintered permanent-magnet production. (iea.org) A Bloomberg Television documentary published on April 13, 2026, followed Phoenix Tailings in New Hampshire as it tried to build domestic rare-earth processing. The segment also interviewed Council on Foreign Relations senior fellow Heidi Crebo-Rediker, author David Abraham, and former United States ambassador Nicholas Burns on how the United States lost processing capacity. (youtube.com) United States Geological Survey data show why startups are chasing that gap. In 2025, the United States produced an estimated 51,000 metric tons of rare-earth-oxide equivalent in mineral concentrates, but imports of rare-earth compounds and metals still rose 169% from 2024. (pubs.usgs.gov) The same pattern runs across other minerals: output can exist outside China, but the bottleneck often sits in refining, chemical conversion, or component-making. The International Energy Agency said recent export controls on rare earths and lithium-ion battery supply chains turned a long-discussed concentration problem into an active trade risk. (iea.org) The chemical side of the chain is now part of that story. Bloomberg reported on April 10 that China had indicated it would halt sulfuric acid exports from May, after producers received notifications and at least one large buyer was told by a Chinese supplier. (bloomberg.com) Sulfuric acid is the workhorse chemical used to leach metal from ore, especially in copper operations, and silver often comes out as a byproduct of those same mines. Kitco argued that tighter acid supply could squeeze silver indirectly by raising costs and constraining throughput at copper mines that also yield silver. (kitco.com) United States Geological Survey data show how exposed industrial systems can be to that input. About 90% of sulfur consumed in the United States is used in the form of sulfuric acid, and imported sulfur plus sulfuric acid supplied 34% of U.S. sulfur consumption in 2025. (pubs.usgs.gov) Silver itself is already a trade-sensitive market. The United States Geological Survey estimated U.S. net import reliance for silver at 77% of apparent consumption in 2025, up from 68% in 2024. (pubs.usgs.gov) Recent mineral controls have shown how quickly a narrow choke point can spread through manufacturing. United States Geological Survey data say China accounted for 99% of primary low-purity gallium production, and the agency recorded Beijing’s 2023 gallium export controls and its December 2024 ban on gallium exports to the United States before a one-year lift in November 2025. (pubs.usgs.gov) The supply-chain race in 2026 is centered on plants, reagents, and intermediate products as much as mines. The documentary’s premise and the latest government and International Energy Agency data point to the same conclusion: the country that controls processing can still control supply. (youtube.com) (usgs.gov) (iea.org)