Iran claims seabed rights in Hormuz

Undersea cables are the hidden plumbing of the internet. The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most sensitive choke points. Now those two things have collided. Over the weekend, IRGC-linked Iranian outlets pushed a new idea: Tehran should treat the seabed under Hormuz as a source of leverage, charge foreign cable operators, and put repairs and maintenance under Iranian control. That is not the same thing as a formal new law. But it is a very clear signal about how some power centers in Iran want to use the strait. ### What actually got proposed? Tasnim laid it out most directly on May 9 in a piece called “Three practical steps for generating revenue from Strait of Hormuz internet cables.” The pitch was blunt: charge licensing and renewal fees, make big foreign tech firms operate under Iranian law, and give Iranian companies exclusive control over cable maintenance and repair. Fars then amplified the same idea on X, calling Hormuz a “hidden highway” and arguing Iran has authority over the seabed there. (iranintl.com) ### Is this an official government decree? Not in the clean, formal sense. What exists right now is a campaign through IRGC-linked media, not a published treaty change or a clear cabinet order. But that does not make it meaningless. In Iran, messaging from outlets tied to the security establishment often functions as a trial balloon — a way to float policy, test reaction, and warn rivals without locking the state into a formal position on day one. (iranintl.com) ### Why does Hormuz matter for the internet? Because multiple subsea cable systems bunch up there. TeleGeography’s cable map and recent industry analysis show the strait and nearby Gulf routes carry major systems linking the Gulf, South Asia, and Europe. The risk is not that “the whole internet” runs through one narrow trench — that part gets exaggerated online. The real problem is concentration. If several cables in the same corridor are damaged or access is restricted, Gulf states and traffic moving between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe can feel it fast. (iranintl.com) ### Can Iran legally do this? That is the weak point in the argument. UNCLOS gives coastal states sovereignty or jurisdiction over waters, bed, and subsoil in straits, but it also says transit passage through straits used for international navigation “shall not be impeded.” Iran’s media argument leans hard on the first half. Most outside experts lean hard on the second. Basically, Tehran can claim rights as a coastal state, but turning that into cable tolls and mandatory Iranian control would run straight into the broader transit regime and existing cable protections under international law. (resources.telegeography.com) ### So is the bigger danger fees or sabotage? Probably coercion first, disruption second. Industry analysts keep making the same point: the most likely immediate cable risk in Hormuz is misadventure — ships, anchors, conflict spillover, repair delays. But once Iranian-linked media publicly map cable routes, talk about permits, and describe outages as economic pressure, the signaling itself becomes part of the threat. You do not need to cut a cable to make operators, insurers, and governments nervous. (un.org) ### Why raise this now? Because Iran is broadening the meaning of “chokepoint.” For years Hormuz meant oil tankers. In March, Iran’s foreign ministry was already insisting that any security arrangements in the strait must respect Iranian rights and interests as the coastal state. Since then, IRGC-linked media have moved from warning that cables are vulnerable to arguing they should become a source of revenue and control. That is a shift from threat signaling to governance signaling. (agbi.com) ### Who gets pressured if this goes further? First the Gulf states and cable operators. Then the cloud and platform companies named in the Iranian messaging — Meta, Amazon, Microsoft, and by implication the wider ecosystem that depends on low-latency links through the region. The catch is that rerouting data is easier than rerouting oil, but not free. Capacity gets tighter, latency rises, and repair politics suddenly matter a lot more. (en.mfa.gov.ir) ### Bottom line? This is not yet a settled legal regime. It is a power play. Iran is telling everyone that the seabed under Hormuz can be treated as leverage too — and that means the digital map of the Gulf is now part of the region’s security map. (iranintl.com)