Central Asia tilts toward China links

Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has accelerated a shift already underway in Central Asia: China is becoming more important to the region’s trade, infrastructure and energy links, while Russia remains deeply embedded in security arrangements. Analysts at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, ORF and other Eurasia-focused research groups have described the pattern as a widening split between economic and security influence, with Beijing gaining ground in commerce and connectivity and Moscow retaining military and political weight. China’s Ministry of Commerce said in January that trade in goods between China and the five Central Asian states reached $106.3 billion in 2025, up 12% from a year earlier and above $100 billion for the first time. The ministry said China became Central Asia’s largest trading partner in 2025, a milestone that underscored how far the region’s commercial ties have moved toward Beijing. (fpri.org) ### Why has the Ukraine war mattered so much for Central Asia’s external links? The war in Ukraine disrupted the northern transport routes that had long tied Central Asian exports and imports to Russian territory. Carnegie Endowment wrote in June that before the 2022 invasion, more than 80% of land traffic between Europe and China moved through the Northern Corridor via Russia and Belarus, including much of Central Asia’s trade. (english.scio.gov.cn) Edward Lemon and Bradley Jardine of FPRI wrote in May that Beijing has since accelerated “parallel corridors, technological dependencies, and trade architectures” that make Central Asia less reliant on Moscow. ORF said this month that Russia’s influence has historically rested on security and political networks, while China has built its position through trade, infrastructure, energy and investment. (carnegieendowment.org) ### What does China’s stronger position look like in practice? Beijing’s rise is most visible in trade, logistics and energy. A Frontiers study published in 2026 said Chinese infrastructure investment and deeper integration into the Chinese economy have made China the leading force behind trade growth in Central Asia. Kazakhstan, the region’s largest economy, offers one example. (fpri.org) Kazakhstan’s Bureau of National Statistics reported foreign trade turnover of $71.8 billion in January-June 2026, while separate trade trackers showed China-Kazakhstan commerce continuing to rise in 2026. Official Chinese data cited by Kazinform put Kazakhstan-China trade at $30.68 billion in the first eight months of 2025. ### If China is gaining economically, why does Russia still matter? (frontiersin.org) Russia still matters because Central Asian security institutions were built around Moscow after the Soviet collapse. ORF said Russia remained the principal external actor through security arrangements, arms supplies, labor migration and cultural ties even after independence, and CEPA wrote that Russia remains the preeminent power in Central Asia in security terms. (stat.gov.kz) The Collective Security Treaty Organization remains one of the clearest examples. CSTO Joint Staff chief Andrei Serdyukov said in February that the alliance’s 2026 plan included 60 events, among them eight joint and specialized exercises across Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Russian military facilities also remain in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, according to regional reporting and analyst discussions in 2026. (orfonline.org) ### Are Central Asian states simply choosing China over Russia? Central Asian governments are not cutting ties with Moscow so much as broadening their options. The ICDS wrote in 2025 that the region is balancing Russia, China and other outside powers, while IRSEM said Central Asian states are using competition among China, Russia, the EU and others to preserve autonomy and widen economic opportunities. (caspiannews.com) That helps explain why the region can deepen trade with China while still participating in Russian-led security formats. Analysts have repeatedly described this as a division of labor, even as the balance within that arrangement has shifted since 2022. ### What should readers watch next? China-Central Asia trade data for 2026 and the rollout of new transport corridors will show whether Beijing’s commercial lead keeps widening. (icds.ee) CSTO exercises scheduled across 2026, along with Russian defense ties in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, will indicate how much security leverage Moscow continues to hold as the region’s economic map changes. (english.scio.gov.cn) (fpri.org)