China policy splits tactics

Washington is drawing a very tight circle around its China contact before the planned May summit between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping: United States Trade Representative Jamieson Greer said the next step is a Zoom call, not a trip to Beijing, and he said there is no new push to expand two-way investment before the leaders meet. (thestar.com.my) Greer’s message was not “no contact.” It was “working-level groups are meeting regularly,” with the political layer kept narrow and procedural instead of turning the summit into a pre-announced economic reset. (thestar.com.my), (scmp.com) That matters because trade and investment are different gears. Trade talks can be handled like a checklist of tariffs, market access, and shipments, while investment means letting capital, factories, and long-term corporate bets move across the relationship. (bloomberg.com), (thestar.com.my) So the United States line going into the summit looks less like a reopening and more like guardrails: keep the channel open, keep the agenda controlled, and avoid any signal that Washington is inviting a fresh wave of China-linked investment before the leaders sit down. (thestar.com.my), (bloomberg.com) At almost the same moment, India moved in the opposite commercial direction. New Delhi approved changes in March 2026 that ease its 2020 screening rules for investment from neighboring countries, including China, in selected manufacturing sectors such as electronic components, capital goods, and solar cells. (bloomberg.com), (cnbc.com) India did not do that because the border dispute vanished. India did it after its trade deficit with China climbed past $100 billion, with one report putting the April 2025 to February 2026 gap at $102 billion, which turned Chinese components from a security problem into a supply problem too. (forbesindia.com), (thaiindia.net) The easing has been selective, not sweeping. Reuters reported in March that India had already begun allowing limited imports of Chinese equipment for state-run power and coal companies after shortages and project delays, which shows the reset is being driven by bottlenecks on factory floors and in infrastructure projects. (economictimes.indiatimes.com) Then there is Alberta, which is not a country but is acting like a trader with its own balance sheet. On April 9, the Alberta government launched an Alberta-China Advisory Committee to identify trade and investment opportunities with China and said Alberta’s exports to China were worth almost 9.6 billion Canadian dollars in 2025. (publicnow.com), (alberta.ca) Alberta’s calculation is practical. China is Alberta’s largest export market after the United States, and the province says the completed Trans Mountain Expansion pipeline is expected to lift crude exports to 220,700 barrels a day in 2025, giving it more reason to court Asian buyers. (publicnow.com), (alberta.ca) Put those three moves together and the split becomes clear. Washington is treating China like a sensitive negotiation to be managed from the top down, while India and Alberta are treating China like a market they cannot fully ignore when factories need inputs and exporters need customers. (thestar.com.my), (cnbc.com), (publicnow.com) That is what the story is now: one China policy in Washington, and a growing number of China tactics everywhere else. The summit can still happen, the calls can stay virtual, and the business ties can still thicken underneath, one province, one ministry, and one supply chain exception at a time. (scmp.com), (economictimes.indiatimes.com), (publicnow.com)